China's

　　richest man might have been running a massive fraud

　　（这是华盛顿邮报2015年5月27日的文章，对汉能有兴趣的人请自己翻译阅读，这里只对每段的中心大意给出提纲式的中文翻译）

　　ByMatt

　　O'BrienMay 27Follow @ObsoleteDogma

　　The only thing we know for sure is

　　that stock in Hanergy Thin Film Power, a solar panel company equipment owned by

　　what was at the time China's richest man,fell 47 percent last Wednesday. We don't know exactly why it fell,

　　or even how much its Chairman Li Hejun lost when it did, since he apparently

　　upped his bet against his own company in the days before the crash. Just that it

　　did.

　　汉能薄膜发电，这家由中国首富所拥有的公司，上个星期三跌了47%，这是我们知道的唯一的事情。我们不知道它为什么会跌，甚至不知道事情发生时，它的主席李河君究竟损失了多少，因为，在股价崩溃前，李河君显然在与自己公司的对赌中加大了赌注。

　　When you put all the pieces

　　together, though, it looks even worse. It looks like Hanergy might be China's

　　Enron: an Energy Company of the Future? whose stock price could only go up as

　　long as it was borrowing money and could only borrow money as long as its stock

　　price was going up. In other words, a house of cards that was just waiting for

　　the first pieceto fall.

　　综合来看情况可能更糟。汉能可能是中国的安然（“未来的能源公司”）：只有借钱才能保证利润，利润好了股价才能上升，股价上升才能继续借钱。这个纸牌屋只不过一直在等待第一张纸牌的倒下。

　　Now, the first thing to know about

　　Hanergy is that it'sreallytwo companies. There's the privately owned

　　parent corporation, Hanergy Group, and the publicly traded subsidiary, Hanergy

　　Thin Film Power （HFT）。 So far, so normal. The curious part, though, is

　　thatalmost all of HFT's sales are to its parent company at a net profit

　　margin of 50 percent.And even more curious is thatthe parent company

　　hasn't actually, well, paidfor most of the solar panel equipment it's

　　ostensibly bought from HFT. Through 2013,only 35 percent of the accounts between the two had been

　　settled.

　　首先我们应当知道的是，实际上有两个汉能：上市公司----汉能薄膜发电（HFT），和私人公司---母公司汉能集团：奇怪的是，汉能薄膜发电几乎所有的销售都是给母公司的，而且销售的利润率高达50%，更奇怪的是，母公司实际上并未向HFT支付大部分货款。2013年的货款只支付了35%。

　　Why so low? The question answers

　　itself. Hanergy must not have the cash. The problem is that the parent company

　　hasborrowed a lot of

　　money at high interest rates, but

　　can't make that back since its factories, which, remember, are supposed to be

　　building solar panels out of the equipment it's gotten from HFT, are running at

　　such lowcapacity—or maybenone at all, according to a hedge fund manager who visited a

　　plant—that theymust be losing money. So it sure seemslike Hanergy Group has more debt

　　than it can pay back, but is trying to keep people from realizing that by moving

　　money from its left hand to its right and back again—that is, between its parent

　　and subsidiary—to make it look like there's actually money coming in.

　　汉能集团之所以无力支付汉能薄膜发电（HFT）大部分货款，因为集团公司没有钱。汉能集团一直以高息借了大量的资金，但是又无法偿还，因为它的工厂的设备产能非常小，甚至可能完全没有。根据参观过汉能工厂的对冲基金经理的看法，他们必然在亏损。所以，可以确信的是，汉能集团资不抵债，但又不希望被人们发现他们只不过把钱从左口袋到右口袋（母公司和子公司）来回倒腾----他们必须使公司看上去是有现金流入的。

　　The question, then, isn't how this

　　fell apart. It's how it lasted as long as it did.And the answer is HFT's

　　stock. Think about it like this. How does a company that's got too much debt and

　　too little profits—if any—convince people to keep lending to it? Well, it could

　　try to hide what it owes and what it's making, but even that probably wouldn't

　　be enough. It'd need collateral. Like, say, its subsidiary's booming stock.

　　Although in this case, the word "booming" doesn't come close to describing what

　　happened. Before its recent plunge, HFT's stock had risen more than 20-fold

　　since the start of 2013 on its supposedly brisk business with its parent

　　company. But even then, this made approximately zero sense. It wasn't just that

　　HFT went up so much that, on paper, it was worth more than six times as much as

　　its closest competitor. It was theway it went up—specifically,

　　in the last 10 minutes of every day.

　　所以，问题并不是他们怎么崩溃的，而是他们如何能够坚持这么长时间才崩溃。答案是HFT公司的股票。请这样考虑：公司如何能够在如此巨额的债务和如此微薄的利润（假如有的话）的情况下，能够使人们相信他们而继续借钱给他们呢？不错，他们可以隐瞒他们的欠款和实际盈利状况，但即便那样也依然不足以让人相信。他们还需要担保。例如，子公司（汉能薄膜发电）的牛气冲天的股票，尽管在这种情况下，“牛气冲天”已经不足以形容实际发生的情况了。在最近的股价跳水之前，HFT的股票涨了20倍，而这完全是依赖向母公司的销售所得来的纸面利润所支撑的。但即便是那样，这一切都毫无意义。HFT的股价增值如此之多，是同期其竞争对手的6倍；但这依然不是问题，问题是他们股价上升的方式----仅仅在每天股市交易时段的最后十分钟。

　　It turns out there are two HFT

　　stocks. There's the money-losing one most of the day, and the

　　invincibleone at the end of it. By the Financial Times'calculation, if you'd bought $1,000 worth of HFT stock at 9 a.m.

　　every morning and sold it at 3:30 p.m. every afternoon since January 2013, you'd

　　have only had $635 left by this February. But if you'd sold at 3:50 p.m.

　　instead, your stock would have gone up to a healthyto $1,285.

　　And if you'd held on until closing at 4 p.m., your stock would have shot up a

　　more-than-healthyeight times to$8,430.

　　股市上的汉能（HFT）股票也有两只：一只是每天下午三点半之前的汉能，这只股票在每天的大部分时间中，是亏钱的股票；另一只是每天收市前最后十分钟的汉能，这是一支勇往直前的股票。根据英国《金融时报》的计算，从2013年1月算起，如果你买了前者，到今年2月份，1000元将变为635元；如果你将股票的卖出时间从每天下午三点半延迟到3：50分，那么你的1000元能够变成1285元；如果你坚持到收市前的4点钟卖出，那么，你的1000元将变为8430元。

　　That's some pattern. And it's one

　　that isn't likely to have happened by chance.It sure seems like—there are

　　those words again—HFT's stock must have been getting manipulated up at the end

　　of every trading day. But who could have been doing this? Well, there aren't too

　　many suspects. That's because Hanergy's Chairman, Li Hejun, is not only the

　　person with the strongest motive to do so, but he's also about the only one who

　　seems to have been buying HFT's stock in the first place. Indeed, while hedge

　　funds have beenso eager to bet against

　　HFT that it's hard to find shares

　　to short, Hejun hasincreased his

　　holdings up to the legal limit. He

　　now owns74.96 percent of HFT against the 75 percent he's allowed to

　　own.

　　这种股票上升的模式不大可能是随机发生的。显然的确很有可能

　　----不得不使用这些词语----汉能的股票在每天的交易时间的最后时段被人操纵了。谁在操纵？嫌疑人屈指可数。汉能的主席，李河君先生，不仅有足够强大的动机，而且他几乎是唯一一个从一开始就一直购买汉能股票的人。的确，当对冲基金想要下注汉能时，很难在短线市场上找到股票。李河君增持其股票已经达到了持股上限。现在，他拥有74.96%的HFT股票，而他允许拥有的上限是75%。

　　Here's one theory about what

　　happened. Suppose that Hanergy wasn't making enough money to pay back what

　　itowed other than by borrowing from new lenders to pay off the old. And

　　then suppose it got these new loans by pledging its subsidiary HFT's shares as

　　collateral. （We actually know it did this）。 It'd need those shares to keep going

　　up if it was going to keep getting the loans it needed—so it'd use what money it

　　did have to push the stock price higher and higher. But there's only so much it

　　could do this. Once Hejun hitthe 75 percent limit on how much of the

　　company he could own, he couldn't push up its price anymore. Then Hanergy

　　wouldn't be able to borrow anymore, and, as a result, wouldn't be able to pay

　　back what it owes anymore. It'd default, and its lenders would sell the HFT

　　shares being held as collateralto try to recoup their losses—which,

　　theFinancial Timesreports, is exactly what happened.

　　这里是关于所发生的事件的一个理论推断：假如汉能从未获得足够的盈利以归还其债务，而是一直借新钱来还旧债，再假定他是用他所拥有的HFT的股票作为担保物来获得新的贷款的（我们知道，他实际上的确是这么做的），那么，他需要他的股价不断地抬升，因为这有利于担保他借到更多的钱，但提升股价就需要不断购股，这导致李河君的持股达到75%的上市公司的大股东持股上限，这样他就无法继续购买股票，所以股价就无法继续提升，所以汉能集团无法再以股权质押贷款，所以汉能无法归还之前的贷款，所以抵押权人售出汉能股份。根据《金融时报》，这不是设想，而是实际发生的情况。

　　Again, this is just speculation.

　　It's trying to fit what we know into a story that makes sense. But if it were

　　true, we might expect Hejun to start betting against his company once he

　　realized it was all going to come crashing down. And that seems to be what he

　　did. Hejunincreased his short

　　positionagainst HFT from 5.81 to 7.71

　　percent right before its stock halved. It's certainly curious.

　　当然，这只是一种猜测，这只不过是将我们已知的信息装入一个框架以使得整个事件有某种意义。但是，如果这是真的，我们会发现，李河君在与自己的公司对赌，而他如果达到目标，公司就将崩溃。这看来就是他所做的事情。在股票腰斩前，李河君将他所持有的汉能薄膜发电（HFT）的淡仓从5.81%增加到了7.71%。这当然很诡异。

　　It might just be Enron with Chinese

　　characteristics.

　　这很可能是有中国特色的安然（ENRON）。